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INTRODUCTION
Many market segments in the large information, communications, and entertainment ecosystem have a dominant venture serving as an intermediary between upstream ventures-such as content creators, video programming aggregators, and software vendors-and downstream consumers. 1 With the successful development of a platform, intermediaries can serve a large percentage of the total number of available downstream users without having to install and operate all the broadband networks needed to switch, route, and deliver content.
2 These ventures can accrue what economists term "positive network [ing] externalities," 3 where the overall value in a network and its ability to generate consumer benefits grows as more users participate. Broadband platform operators can quickly serve a global consumer population and convince prospective customers of the benefits in joining the 4. See, e.g., Micah L. Sifry, In Facebook We Antitrust, NATION (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/in-facebook-we-antitrust.
5. Khan, supra note 1, at 785 (recognizing that the "winner take all" dominance is most prevalent in online platform markets because network effects and control over data acquired early on become self-reinforcing over time-leading to market dominance by a small number of firms, which is illustrated by Walmart's recent purchase of Jet.com); see also Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host's Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets for Informational Goods, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1876 (2011) (noting that the general need to "trigger and maintain positive feedback effects" in order to succeed is augmented in "winner take all" markets where users tend to only use, or not use, one single platform at a time); Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 413 (2014) [hereinafter Economics of Control] ("Google's rise was facilitated by an array of exclusive contracts that, given the seeming winner-take-all nature of the search advertising market, should be evaluated by antitrust authorities as a potential exercise in illegal foreclosure by the company.").
6. Des Traynor, Surviving and Thriving in Two-Sided Markets, INSIDE INTERCOM (Aug. 14, 2012), https://blog.intercom.com/surviving-thriving-in-two-sided-markets ("Winner-takes-all markets are high risk and high reward. The losers crash and burn while the winner is left with a lucrative legal monopoly.").
7. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 146 (2017) (explaining that the relationships forged through the platform intermediaries are unique in that they are "two-or multi-sided: they serve buyers, the sellers seeking to reach them, and often advertisers seeking the buyers' attention" and that the terms of each relationship can be defined differently).
8. Two-sided markets operate when the amount of transactions effectuated between end-users depends on both the structure and level of fees charged by the platform which simultaneously impact both sides' willingness to trade. 
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innovation, employment, and other key factors. 10 On the positive side, intermediaries can promote efficiency, economies of scale, 11 and beneficial network externalities. On the negative side, intermediaries may leverage dominant market shares to extract high prices from both upstream and downstream participants after acquiring market dominance through a sustained period of below market pricing. 12 Additionally, they can erect barriers to market entry, acquire insurgent companies, and use comparative advantages to dominate in both core and related markets, such as the collection, processing, and sale of "Big Data"
13 about subscriber behavior.
14 Intermediaries attempt to maximize market share in their decisions about cost recovery. 15 Consumers may think platform operators offer "free" 16 or subsidized services by appearing to recover all costs from (noting that while data mining helps predict future behaviors, which is highly valuable to the economy, this added value is at the "extreme expense of unwitting users and the research community"); see also David S. Evans 17 While consumers do have to pay for products and services, of which the advertising costs and other subsidies generate higher prices, consumers embrace marketing promotions that offer real or perceived subsidies. 18 In exchange for free or below cost services, consumers allow intermediaries to compile information about their online behavior, location, purchases, searches, website visits, and other activities, which is then used by data analytics firms and advertisers to improve targeting of commercial advertisements. 19 Privacy intrusions 20 and the commodification of consumer behavior generate significant value that a platform operator can use to generate revenues in ways that most subscribers may not fully understand or quantify. 21 This Article asserts that any analysis of costs and benefits occurring via broadband intermediary transactions necessitates an assessment of impacts occurring on both sides of the platform. Heretofore, legislators, judges, regulators, policy makers, business executives, and academics have solely examined or emphasized the downstream impacts.
22 This focus appears prudent because consumers, who vote with dollars, are situated downstream. Likewise, the most immediate and measurable antitrust law has yet to "develop an adequate response to zero-price markets" and that the advent of the internet has increased the use of zero-price products, making the current combined market capitalization easily exceed $1 trillion); see also David S. 17. Steven Semeraro, Assessing the Competitive Effects of Surcharging the Use of Payment Mechanisms, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 29, 37 (2018) (emphasizing that to obtain an efficient output level in a two-sided market, producers "must charge the customer set that is more sensitive to price less than marginal cost of serving that customer (effectively enabling those consumers to internalize the benefits to both sides of the market)").
18. 
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consequences may appear on the downstream side. 23 Considering the decision by intermediaries to shift costs upstream, analysts of two-sided markets may overestimate consumer benefits by failing to consider offsetting costs occurring when upstream transactions are examined.
24
The predisposition to concentrate on consumer impacts and identify welfare enhancement has existed well before the onset of internet-based intermediaries. For example, credit card vendors have offered subsidies, including cash rebates, to consumers even if they pay on time and trigger no offsetting interest charge. 25 Free to radio and television, broadcasters have offered consumers the opportunity for "free rider" consumption of content, without the obligation to purchase any of the goods and services advertised by upstream vendors.
26
This Article demonstrates how a dual analysis of both downstream and upstream impacts can result in a better calibrated impact assessment. In some cases, apparent harm to consumers and competition, such a contractual prohibition on vendors steering customers to credit cards with lower vendor fees, can be offset by 23 consumer and competitive benefits, e.g., diversification of credit card types including ones offering rebates and airline miles. 27 In other instances, so-called false negative findings of no harm to consumers and competition can be corrected with the identification of detrimental impacts, particularly on the often-unexamined upstream side of the market. 28 Countervailing proof of harm may result from an assessment of the marketplace and consumer impact in upstream commercial transactions occurring directly and indirectly with downstream consumers. For example, consumers agree to intermediary mining, analysis, and sale of data about their wants, needs, interests, consumptive behavior, website visits, purchases, location, and internet searches.
29
This data has value that subsidizes the "free" access to content and other services. 30 Upstream vendors and intermediaries also can use data mining 31 to make frequent changes to their prices for goods and services.
32 Such calibration has the potential to eliminate or reduce consumer surplus, which occurs when the charged price falls below what a consumer willingly would pay. 33 Simply put, the value proposition of what broadband intermediaries offer combines both costs and benefits, and thus requires an assessment of both factors by consumers and government agencies that have jurisdiction to oversee the potential for harm to consumers and markets.
This 
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Two-sided markets have operated in the economy for many centuries, well before the onset of the internet and broadband networks. 34 Recent examples include advertiser subsidized access to newspapers and broadcast media, wireless smartphone operating systems, commercial aviation reservation systems, dating matchmakers, and travel agencies.
35
Conversion of analog telecommunications infrastructure into high-speed broadband networks, fast processing computers, cheap and high capacity memory and data storage, and other technological innovations have led to a proliferation of platform intermediaries as well as the potential for them to achieve remarkably quick financial success. 36 Companies such as Airbnb, Alibaba, Amazon, Didi Chuxing, Facebook, Google, Netflix, Tencent, Twitter, and Uber have quickly achieved "unicorn" status with over $1 billion in market value.
37
The internet ecosystem favors two-sided market platforms because intermediaries can offer faster, better, smarter, cheaper, and more convenient solutions to consumers' wants, needs, and desires than what traditional "bricks and mortar" ventures offer.
38 By interconnecting with broadband networks, digital platform operators can establish a global service footprint without having to invest startup funds on content distribution networks.
39
Two-sided market ventures are optimally suited to exploit the positive networking externalities available from widespread availability and robust consumer adoption. 40 
41
A major business model for internet-mediated platforms masterfully uses flexibility in pricing to create the impression by prospective subscribers that their access to valuable content and services can occur without payment.
42
Intermediary platforms can calibrate who pays and, in most instances, the direct payment of financial compensation comes primarily or exclusively from upstream ventures, such as advertisers. 43 Advertising rates and other revenues can defray or eliminate the need for platform operators to require monetary payment from downstream subscribers. 44 Of course, consumers bear an obligation to provide something of great value: consent to the acquisition, processing, and marketing of data about their wants, needs, desires, web travels, location, interests, searches, etc. 45 Most platform users may underestimate the value of the privacy invading consumer data they relinquish freely.
46
Many of the internet unicorns, operating a digital platform, rely on advertiser subsidies, broadband network distribution, and the convergence of content and conduit to package a desirable internetmediated service, such as social networking. To acquire a full appreciation of broadband intermediary costs and benefits to consumers, one should examine the transactions that occur on both sides of the platform. For example, downstream subscribers may benefit from access to "free" content, but at a possibly substantial cost considering the effect of upstream data analysts, brokers and advertisers, as well as election meddlers, provocateurs, and purveyors of "fake news." 50 II. CONSUMER WELFARE GAINS FROM TWO-SIDED MARKETS Two-sided markets offer many benefits to consumers, largely because upstream ventures willingly pay intermediaries that in turn subsidize downstream access.
51
Having no direct financial payment to make, consumers may assume they pay nothing for opportunities to participate in beneficial transactions. For example, the legacy credit card model 52 offers users the opportunity to purchase products and services without point of sale cash payments, a benefit in terms of both convenience and the opportunity to acquire a short-term loan without interest. 53 Information, communications, and entertainment intermediaries provide access to many different types of software, applications, services, and diverse content, typically without requiring any direct payment. 54 A mutually beneficial transaction combines ample benefits for platform 49 00 PM), https://theconversation.com/how-facebookuses-the-privacy-paradox-to-keep-users-sharing-94779 (arguing that consumers are "unwilling to take actual steps to protect themselves" because "privacy is an abstract feeling" and people struggle to place an absolute value on it); Just, supra note 15, at 391 (explaining that internet platforms "extract economic value" from data).
57. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 89 (stressing the scope of the "digital platform revolution"). 58. Scale economies refer to the ability of a single firm to produce a good or service at the lowest per unit cost. "For nearly 100 years, microeconomic theory said that widespread access to telephone technology was more business/as-competition-wanesamazon-cuts-back-its-discounts.html (explaining that Amazon grew to become "one of the largest retailers in the country" by reducing or eliminating profit margins, which in turn drove retail competitors out of business). However, now, Amazon can raise prices because consumers may not take the time and effort to search for alternatives. Id.
64. See Evgeny Morozov, Tech Titans Are Busy Privatizing Our Data, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/24/th e-new-feudalism-silicon-valley-overlords-advertising-necessary-evil (contending that tech firms are willing to offer goods and services "at highly subsidised [sic] rates" because they yield more data).
65. See id. (explaining that it can be difficult for users to understand the true cost of these subsidized services).
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consumers. 66 Because intermediary platform users permit data mining without compensation, it could be assumed that such content constitutes a commodity or currency that the data miner can use, while at the same time claiming that no market-based transaction has occurred. Arguing that no market exists can bolster assertions that zero-price transactions have limited, if any, impacts on relevant market definitions made by antitrust courts.
67
Even in the short term, consumers may suffer from the loss of brick and mortar store competition, as well as from the consequences of more accurate assessment of consumer price sensitivity and increasingly invasive collection of subscribers' consumption behavior and the brokering of such data by largely unregulated ventures.
68
At some point, online platform operators may consider their market position sufficiently impenetrable so that they can refrain from aggressive price cutting and forgoing near term profitability to acquire market share. 69 66. Glance, supra note 56 (explaining that, despite user concern for privacy, users are unwilling to "take actual steps to protect themselves" because "privacy is an abstract feeling," people struggle to place an absolute value on it or evaluate how privacy violations may be harmful); see also Susan Athey et al., The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money, Small Costs, Small Talk 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23488, 2017), http://papers.nber.org/tmp/99580-w23488.pdf (examining consumer behavior when faced with "notice and choice" to safeguard their privacy).
67. "With personal data being a potential currency, essentially a non-monetary price paid . . . and privacy a possible non-price competitive element . . . the question regarding the relationship between regulation-in this case privacy, consumer and data protection laws-and competition law has re-emerged . . . ." Just, supra note 15, at 391 (asserting the need for changes in competition policy to consider how zero priced transactions affect competition and consumers). 
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A. Dynamic Pricing Reduces Consumer Surplus
Platform operators and upstream vendors can develop sophisticated data analytics to help accurately set and frequently modify prices for commercial transactions. 70 Bear in mind that while some platform operators, such as Facebook and Twitter, rely almost solely on upstream advertiser payments, 71 other intermediaries combine that revenue stream with downstream sales of goods and services, e.g., Amazon, Airbnb, Didi Chuxing, and Uber. acquire and analyze data about current consumer demand and available supply of products and services-e.g., the number of available Uber drivers in a specific locality. 75 Rather than set a fixed price, only occasionally raised or lowered, vendors can make frequent pricing changes based on current marketplace conditions calculated by proprietary software that processes freely acquired user data collected by the intermediary platform operator and forwarded to upstream vendors. 76 Arguably, dynamic pricing promotes overall marketplace efficiency by injecting more frequently and timely fine-tuning of prices based on changes in supply and demand. 77 However, consumers may consider it unfair and discriminatory, particularly when so-called surge pricing unexpectedly raises out of pocket costs significantly. 76. See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 73, at 1780 (explaining that online platforms can adjust prices within milliseconds using dynamic pricing and algorithms, which optimize a good's price based on available stock and anticipated demand).
77. For example, if the electric industry used dynamic pricing, ideally "temporary price spikes would induce immediate demand reductions, and ultimately, lower prices," whereas "sustained high prices would provide a sufficient reward for investment in adequate generation resources, ensuring reliability. 78. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1029 (2014) (noting that digital market manipulation "creates subjective privacy harms" because consumers do not know whether they are being charged the same price as someone else or even if "using a different browser or purchasing the item on a different day" would have saved them money).
79. Dynamic pricing is also coupled with behavioral psychology. For example, a real-time gasoline pricing tool in Holland had not lowered a station's prices in response to a sale at the station across the street. Instead, the program "determined that long waiting times at the bargain-priced station would discourage buyers," accurately predicting that many buyers would utilize the station "across the street 2019]
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and oversupply might trigger short term price reductions, consumers may focus on rapid and substantial surge prices.
80
Critics of a platform-dominated economy emphasize harm to both consumers and workers:
A "peer economy" of platform-arranged production will break down old hierarchies. Gig workers will be able to knit Etsy scarves in the morning, drive Uber cars in the afternoon, and write Facebook comments at night, flexibly shifting between jobs and leisure at will. But is platform capitalism really a route to opportunity for labor, or just one more play for capital accumulation in an increasingly stratified economy? 81 The costs and risks borne by non-employee contractors surely challenge the view that they can combine flexible schedules and independence with certain and generous hourly earnings.
B. Lack of Transparency
Far too many platform operators rely on lengthy and obtuse subscription agreements to set out the terms and conditions for their acquisition, analysis, use, and sale of consumer data.
82 These nonnegotiable contracts of adhesion create enforceable rights for platform intermediaries, but few responsibilities and curbs on their data mining and sale.
83 Worse yet, some major broadband platform intermediaries have allowed data acquisition and mining opportunities, directly or through third parties, far exceeding the ample options they have reserved. 84 To make matters worse, some platform operators do not where they would be willing to pay more. According to Facebook, the wireless manufacturers left such valuable consumer data inside handset memory storage so that it could only enhance the Facebook experience without any other sort of commercial exploitation by third parties. 92 This response appears to create the impression that the handset manufacturers, which surely paid for the consumer data access opportunity, made no apparent use of the data other than to offer more convenient mobile access to Facebook service features. Apparently, this enhancement offsets any potential for consumer privacy invasion, intentional violation of contractual curbs, and national security threats when offering access to Chinese handset manufacturers accused of supporting espionage endeavors of their government. 96 Consumers still can free-ride subsidized services by not following through with initial and supplemental purchases as suggested by platform software.
93
C. Free Does Not Mean at No Cost
97
On the other hand, most consumers seem uncertain about the marketplace value of their data, even though many intermediaries have business plans that derive most revenues from frequent auctions for highly calibrated advertising placements. 98 Advertisers underwrite consumer access to content and services through paid placements 99 on all the display screens currently in use (televisions, computers, smartphones, tablets, and wearables, such as watches). These microtransactions add up, particularly for ventures such as Facebook 100 and Google 101 that have a global subscriber base making frequent service requests almost every day. 98. See Singer, supra note 96 (explaining that, within milliseconds, algorithms collect users' browsing history and auction this information to marketers, so that they can show users ads that are tailored specifically to them). 
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Few would criticize Google and other ventures for failing to offer something of significant value or for having exceeded the boundary lines of capitalism and entrepreneurship. However, consumers increasingly may have begun to realize that "free access" to platforms comes at a significant cost. Economists remind us that there "is no free lunch" 102 in commercial transactions and neither is there truly free access to internet-mediated content and services. 103 Rather than require payment in currency, platform operators extract value from the consumer data they mine, process, collate, curate, analyze, and sell. 104 In effect, subscribers are both consumers of service provided by the intermediary, as well as the product of what the platform operator offers advertisers in exchange for monetary compensation.
IV. REASONS FOR EMPHASIS ON DOWNSTREAM IMPACTS
Government agencies have several rationales supporting their emphasis on downstream impacts of intermediary activities. The agencies can reasonably conclude that the most significant impact on consumers will occur in their direct interaction with the intermediary, perhaps discounting the significance of less direct interaction with upstream ventures whose access to consumers is specified in separate commercial agreements with the platform operator. [T] he phrase 'there is no free lunch' is often credited to pre-Prohibition U.S. saloons. Tied-houses would offer thirsty lunch crowds a 'free lunch' if they purchased beer or other alcoholic beverages during the lunch session.").
103. See Morozov, supra note 64 (explaining platforms are willing to offer services "at highly subsidised [sic] rates" because data is the source of their profits).
104. See Just, supra note 15, at 391 (arguing that personal data is a potential currency because internet platforms collect data to "extract economic value from it").
105 
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In addition to focusing on consumers and their opportunities for short term benefits, such as subsidies and free-rider opportunities, government agencies face other disincentives to look upstream. Currently prevailing political and economic policy promote reduced government oversight.
114
Government agencies appreciate the negative public perception of appearing to expand their regulatory "wingspan." 115 The agencies risk triggering claims of mission creep by upstream stakeholders who also may assert that the government agencies lack jurisdiction to conduct any investigation. The reluctance to probe upstream activities may also stem from the increasingly questionable conclusion that upstream vendors do not operate in ways that might harm consumers. Belatedly, we have seen data mining generating significant and unexpected adverse consequences; including, direct impacts on presidential elections, manipulating public opinion through fake news, 120 and acquiring data about consumers who have not consented to any sort of mining and may not even know their data has been extracted, analyzed, and sold. 121 Additionally, regulatory agencies may have concluded that previous enforcement actions and consent decrees provide sufficient safeguards.
122 Such confidence appears misinformed or misguided in light of recent news accounts reporting on the lack of transparency and possible violations of existing Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consent decrees by Facebook, Google, and other intermediaries.
123
Government agencies-with clear jurisdiction to assess the potential for harm to consumers and competition-continue to use evaluative tools primarily created for and applied to bricks and mortar transactions.
124
While governments have applied these tools to information-age transactions-e.g., credit cards-until quite recently, the analysis largely has ignored the two-sided market structure and failed to appreciate that this industrial structure has significant 
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potential for both benefitting and harming consumers. 125 With an emphasis on current market definition and share, government agencies may fail to see interaction between intermediaries and upstream ventures that have direct and indirect impacts on downstream consumers. 126 By emphasizing what can be identified and measured easily, government agencies fail to see more obscure offsetting costs and harms. 127 V. OHIO V. AMERICAN to prevent finding anticompetitive harms where little or none exist-a false positive-and perhaps also to avoid decision making that ignores consumer harms-a false negative. 130 In American Express Co., the conservative majority of the Court, endorsing recent economic doctrine championed by academics, Supreme Court endorsed the finding that the district court should have assessed consumer impacts on both sides of the market served by the credit card issuing company: the downstream users of cards and the upstream vendors accepting cards for payment. 133 The alleged vertical restraint involved so-called anti-steering contractual language that prohibited vendors, agreeing to accept American Express credit cards, from trying to persuade customers to use a different card that imposed lower "swipe fee" 134 processing costs on the vendor. The district court suggested that relevant market and impact analysis of anti-steering contractual language required consideration of how anti-steering provisions affected both merchants and consumersostensibly a complete two-sided market assessment. However, the district court focused on how the anti-steering contractual language helped maintain higher swipe fees that harmed both competition among credit card issuers and consumers with apparently no offsetting benefits.
135
This court also determined that American Express had market power because it imposed twenty fee increases over a five-year period without losing market share in terms of the number of vendors accepting its cards and credit card transaction processing.
136
The district court concluded that in the absence of the anti-steering provisions, swipe fees to merchants and consumer costs would have been lower. 137 The court considered as corroborating evidence the decision by the Discover credit card company to abandon its business 136. Id. at 188 (finding that American Express possesses market power due to its "significant market share in a highly concentrated market with high barriers to entry" and the ability to increase swipe fees frequently without losing market share).
137. Id. at 208 (finding that the Plaintiffs demonstrated harm in the form of "inflated merchant discount rates" passed on to customers from "higher retail prices").
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model of offering comparatively lower fees as an inducement for more vendors to accept the card for payment and in turn to acquire greater market share of credit card usage. 138 As the company having the smallest market share, Discover sought to differentiate its card with merchants; however, Discover could not acquire more market share because vendors could not encourage customers to use its credit card.
139
Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court opted to examine market impacts on both sides of the credit card platform marketplace. 140 These appellate courts both concluded that to assess the complete impact of a credit card company's anti-steering contractual language, judges should identify and consider the consequences of any positive or negative impact.
141
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the credit card network participants (card issuers, banks, and merchants) must consider the interdependency 142 between both merchants and cardholders, because price changes on one side can result in demand changes on the other side. If a merchant finds that a network's fees to accept a particular card exceed the benefit that the merchant gains by accepting that card, then the merchant likely will choose not to accept the card. On the other side, if a cardholder finds that too few merchants accept a particular card, then the cardholder likely will not want to use that card in the first place. Accordingly, in order to succeed, a credit-card network must "find an effective method for balancing the prices on the two sides of the market." 143 138. "American Express's merchant restraints also render it nearly impossible for a firm to enter the relevant market by offering merchants a low-cost alternative to the existing networks." Id. at 213 (citing the failure of Discover's lower swipe fee model Both appellate courts undertook a comparison of costs and benefits affecting both vendors and credit card users.
144 While anti-steering rules mandated by credit card issuers can constitute an illegal vertical restraint on trade by reducing competition among credit card companies, the courts considered the potential for offsetting positive financial impact on credit card users through more generous and diversified benefits, e.g., financial rebates and enhanced travel services. 145 Analysis by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized how variance in costs incurred by both vendors and credit card users can impact both sides of the platform operated by a credit card issuer.
146
Considering the interdependency of product and service vendors and consumers using credit cards, the court identified two joint market effects not considered by the district court: (1) the impact of antisteering rules on the level of card issuer market competition, and, (2) the impact of credit card issuer anti-steering rules on their incentives to offer usage inducements to consumers. 147 While the credit card marketplace is concentrated with only four companies and evidences substantial barriers to market entry, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted the ease with which consumers can shift card allegiance based on many factors including the costs incurred by using a specific card and the financial inducements offered by credit card issuers to encourage consumer loyalty.
148
The Supreme Court's conservative majority affirmed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis and conclusion that the lower court 144 
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should have assessed the consumer impact of transactions occurring on both sides of the credit card issuer's platform:
Price increases on one side of the platform likewise do not suggest anticompetitive effects without some evidence that they have increased the overall cost of the platform's services. Thus, courts must include both sides of the platform-merchants and cardholders-when defining the credit-card market.
149
The Court determined that both sides of an intermediary platform require examination because two inter-related transactions take place, each of which affect both upstream and downstream participants. 150 By examining the marketplace impact on both sides of the American Express platform, the Court identified consumer and competitive benefits that offset the harm to consumers identified by the district court.
151 Identifying this benefit would not occur if a court examined impacts on just one side of the intermediary's transactions when identifying what constitutes the relevant market for credit card services.
152 Because credit card anti-steering contractual terms might not constitute an unlawful vertical restraint on trade, the reviewing court could avoid a false positive finding of anticompetitive harm to consumers by acquiring a complete evidentiary record, including an assessment about the potentially favorable impact of the anti-steering contractual language on both vendors and consumers. 153 The dissenting opinion in American Express Co., written by Justice Breyer and joined by the three other liberal Justices, disputed the lawfulness of the two-sided market examination. 154 Both camps agreed that an alleged vertical restraint required a "rule of reason" analysis that has three analytical steps.
155
The Court factions disagreed on whether the first step identification of the relevant market includes participants on both sides of the intermediary platform. 156 If only the downstream consumer side requires analysis, then the plaintiffs more readily could identify substantial anticompetitive effects and meet its If successful, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
158
The Court majority determined that had the district court assessed the competitive and consumer impact of the anti-steering rules on both sides of the market, it would not have concluded that the plaintiffs had satisfied their initial burden of introducing evidence of substantial anticompetitive harm. 159 A persuasive case for financial harm had been made with the narrow focus on downstream consumers because higher swipe fees clearly result in higher merchant costs, at least some of which will flow through to consumers. 160 However, the district court could have identified offsetting consumer benefits when considering what "rewards" American Express provides its customers.
161
Justice Breyer, in dissent, strongly asserted that the district court had no reason to expand its market impact analysis, noting that no antitrust case precedent supports doing so. 162 Additionally, he noted case precedent does not favor judicial netting or balancing of competitive benefits and harms occurring in different markets. 163 The sole focus on the immediate impact of higher swipe fees on downstream credit card users ignores other factors that might reduce or eliminate a conclusion of anticompetitive harm, such as higher prices to consumers.
164
A more nuanced, calibrated, and granular analysis considers the credit card ecosystem as both two-sided and segmented by card issuer marketing strategies. 165 Swipe fee pricing strategy constitutes a key differentiator for which credit cards a vendor would accept, but other factors come into play, particularly on the consumer side. 166 Some consumers might want a credit card that offers 
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generous financial rebates and other subsidies, such as airline miles.
167
Others might want one that offers a low short-term interest rate on balance due transfers. 168 Others might willingly pay for the privilege of tapping a benefit-rich inventory, including airline lounge access, "free" baggage allowances on specific airlines, concierge-provided travel assistance, and early opportunities to buy Broadway and concert tickets at face value. 169 In this more segmented marketplace, a credit card company might execute a strategy of demanding comparatively higher swipe fees of vendors to generate more generous and desirable credit card user rewards.
170
Another company might use lower swipe fees as an incentive for more vendors to accept purchases using the card. 171 Arguably, such differentiation promotes a competitive marketplace both in terms of what inducements credit card companies must offer consumers and which card a consumer will use for each transaction.
172
The Court majority noted that American Express uses a marketing strategy geared towards attracting wealthier card users likely to make more expensive purchases. 173 This strategy does not primarily rely on revenues accruing from interest payments by card users not making full payment within a short grace period.
174
It compensates for comparatively fewer transactions and monetary loans with higher swipe fees involving more expensive purchases. 175 Two major credit card issuers, MasterCard and Visa, use a different strategy that is less reliant on swipe fees than on credit card user interest payments.
176
The American Express Co. case emphasizes the need for courts and, by extension, regulatory agencies, to consider the relationship between upstream and downstream market participants in terms of their 167 In the credit card ecosystem, the availability of alternative credit cards and the ease with which consumers can change allegiances evidence a competitive credit card platform marketplace with significant consumer sensitivity to comparative costs and benefits accruing from the use of specific cards.
178
Some credit card users attempt to maximize downstream subsidies and rebates by acquiring many different cards from banks offering generous inducements to apply and strategically using the one card that confers the best benefits for each transaction, e.g., Card A for gasoline, Card B for airline tickets, Card C for restaurants.
179
The division of the Supreme Court on a liberal versus conservative fulcrum in this case may identify what constituencies and economic doctrine each faction favors. The majority persuasively demonstrates that in the credit card ecosystem, two complementary and inter-related transactions take place. 180 In his dissent, Justice Breyer suggests that "the complementary relationship between the products is irrelevant to the purpose of market definition," 181 emphasizing that his understanding of antitrust law and economics was that market analysis should be limited to substitutes.
182
Justice Breyer objects to the majority's decision to determine a net market impact of the antisteering contract provisions by combining the negative impact of higher merchant swipe fees and the positive impact on consumers able to tap into more and better credit card services and rewards. 
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that affect each other and thereby bind them and their markets together. 184 The majority decision deems this integration as evidence that "indirect network effects" 185 apply to both parties, because "the value of the two-sided platform to one group of participants depends on how many members of a different group participate." 186 Arguably, a relevant market analysis requires impact assessment on both sides of an intermediary platform because
[r]aising the price on side A risks losing participation on that side, which decreases the value of the platform to side B. If participants on side B leave due to this loss in value, then the platform has even less value to side A-risking a feedback loop of declining demand. 187 The majority held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving anticompetitive effects in the relevant market, because "the product that credit-card companies sell is transactions, not services to merchants."
188 As a result, the majority argues, the plaintiff must show anticompetitive effects on "the two-sided credit-card market as a whole" by proving that "Amex's anti steering provisions increased the cost of credit-card transactions above a competitive level, reduced the number of credit-card transactions, or otherwise stifled competition in the credit-card market." 192 The Court noted that its decision did not endorse universal assessment of both sides of a two-sided market.
193 However, the case offers a strong precedent for doing so to avoid making an incomplete or wrong marketplace assessment.
194 Arguably, the case provides a rationale for two-sided market examinations when the risk of either a false positive or a false negative exists. 195 This motivation to conduct a macro-level analysis stems from the likely consequences that limiting analysis to one side of the market, while consistent with traditional relevant market definition, 196 misses significant direct, secondary and even tertiary impacts. Justice Breyer's dissent and the friend of court filings by antitrust law and economics scholars make a persuasive argument that the longstanding rule of reason analysis of vertical restraints, such as the antisteering provisions, contemplates a properly calibrated relevant market definition. offsetting harm does come across as a netting or cost/benefit analysis in contrast to the conventional process where a court only looks for a market of substitutes and assesses the potential for harm directly to these competitors.
198
The Supreme Court has endorsed a market definition that considers instances where Peter gets robbed-reduced competition among credit card companies-but Paul gets paidconsumers benefit from enhanced and more valuable credit card services.
199 Without examining both sides of a platform intermediary market, courts would miss both substantial offsetting activities that can contribute benefits (or costs) directly to participants on each side, and even to non-participants. 200 In a broader context, without examining both sides of the platform, courts would not see favorable or harmful impacts that could reduce the likelihood of the court making a false positive or false negative determination of consumer harm. Secondary impacts for internet platforms include the potential for disrupting business models used by brick and mortar vendors of products and services. 201 Tertiary impacts include how internet platforms affect and change labor relations, civil society, elections, what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the potential for loss of trust in a variety of public and private transactions. increasingly difficult as both positive and negative impacts may be difficult to quantify. 203 However, the difficulty and potential for imperfect calculations should not foreclose the analysis. In the American Express Co. case, the offsetting benefits from enhanced card user services were recognized, but not specifically quantified by the reviewing courts. 204 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court majority was confident that the enhancements to the welfare of a specific card-using group of consumers offset the costs to all vendors accepting credit cards and arguably all consumers likely to incur higher prices because of increased swipe fees.
VI. IDENTIFYING ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE NECESSARY UPSTREAM ANALYSIS
The American Express Co. case highlights the importance of relevant market assessment as well as consideration whether consumers have competitive and functionally equivalent options. 206 While the dissent expressed concern that the majority opted to consider both sides of the credit issuer's platform, it emphasized how doing so resulted in a finding that the plaintiff had failed to meet its evidentiary production burden in the first of three steps in a rule of reason analysis regarding an alleged vertical restraint of trade. 207 Such a determination terminates the case, because the second step in a rule of reason analysis occurs only if plaintiffs meet their burden in the first step. 208 Had the case proceeded to the second step, the defendants would have had the opportunity to introduce evidence including how credit card accepting vendors' payments to American Express generated consumer benefits. 209 The defendants also could demonstrate that even in a concentrated market of four major credit card suppliers, consumers can regularly switch and thereby face no lock-in, unlike many internet markets dominated by a single venture.
210
This evidentiary production would have introduced upstream market transactions into the record, so arguably no justice objected to such an analysis of the merchant side of American Express's platform provided it takes place in the proper rule of reason investigative sequence. 211 To calculate both the benefits and costs of an internet ecosystem intermediary's commercial activities, governments and consumers alike should assess what occurs both downstream and upstream. Looking at one market side risks both false positives and negatives, the former likely occurring when considering only subsidized and free rider content access opportunities downstream and the latter likely occurring when considering only the costs incurred by upstream participants.
Downstream impacts-particularly consumer welfare enhancementsappear more easily identified and quantified. 212 On the other hand, upstream impacts are easily obscured as they occur behind the scenes 213 and involve different types of participants, including many not keen on having their actions detected. 214 On this upstream side of the digital intermediary, much harm can beset participants in the internet ecosystem-and even non-participants are at risk. 215 If Russian and other provocateurs successfully interfered with the 2016 United States If better targeting of advertisements constituted the only consequence of data mining, then many participants would have confirmation that the process in the aggregate constitutes a win-win proposition. 222 However, data mining can impose significant privacy-invading, sinister, and harmful costs on downstream consumers. 223 Additionally, "winnertake-all" market dominance can create incentives for most consumers to rely on a single venture unlike the incentives and ease in switching credit cards to maximize benefits from any single transaction. 224 If the potential harm from attempts to meddle in elections via social networks appears too speculative, other more frequent and negative impacts of data mining warrant consideration.
For example, measurable consumer welfare and surpluses decline or evaporate when vendors use data mining for dynamic pricing. 225. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 73, at 1780 (observing how online platforms employ pricing algorithms based on user data to adjust prices for particular individuals in order to optimize the profitability of each transaction); Newman, Costs of Lost Privacy, supra note 222, at 867 (contrasting the benefits of tailored advertisements resulting from data mining with the "darker version of online marketing," where prices are fixed according to each individual's "pain point"-the maximum price he or she is willing to pay).
226. See Newman, Costs of Lost Privacy, supra note 222, at 870 (explaining how digital intermediaries' use of data mining to facilitate dynamic pricing has transformed the model of online commerce and increased vendors' reliance on consumer behavior analytics to create a dispersion of prices aimed at extracting maximum revenue from each transaction).
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Largely unregulated transportation companies, not obligated to provide service under a fixed tariff, can extract maximum revenues based on data mining of current supply and demand. 227 While economists might welcome this practice as more efficient and rational, consumers might consider the transaction unfair and exploitative. 228 Dynamic pricing violates some consumers' sense of fair play even if such price discrimination is lawful and efficient. 229 Consumers generally expect to pay the same advertised or listed price and probably would not respond favorably if they came to understand that data mining improves the ability of merchants to "size up" the individual consumer and calculate a price aimed at eliminating any consumer surplus. 230 Consumers understand price differentials such as volume discounts and delivery costs. 231 Once informed that data mining makes dynamic pricing more prevalent and effective, they might temper their satisfaction with the subscription contract they passively accepted.
A. A Complete and Thorough Assessment of Platform Costs and Benefits
Many consumers, judges, government regulators, and legislators do not fully understand the tradeoffs occurring when digital broadband intermediaries dominate market segments, including internet search, For example, Google constantly conducts advertisement placement auctions, the ample revenues of which subsidize its free services, such as search, email, mapping, language translation, computer and wireless handset operating systems, 239 storage, and word processing.
240
Digital platform subscribers need to know the consequences of commodification of their consumer data, just as courts need to assess the full impact of upstream and downstream transactions. 241 In light of the potential for upside benefits and downside costs, courts should challenge the conventional wisdom that assumes intermediaries massively enhance consumer welfare, and should expand scrutiny to transactions on both sides of the platform. 242 While consumers need to exercise greater care, so too do government agencies and courts having statutory responsibilities to assess the potential for consumer harm and to establish safeguards.
243
Regulatory agencies with jurisdiction to safeguard consumers and reviewing courts should better calibrate the tools they use to investigate the potentially harmful effects of platform intermediaries on competition and consumers, with emphasis on the potential for privacy intrusions, unfair trade practices, market concentration, subscriber 238. See id. (stating that in the absence of a monetary exchange between provider and consumer, "monetized data . . . supports consumer access to an ever-expanding selection of free, high-quality services and content, . . . much of which was previously available only for a substantial fee").
239. The European Commission determined that Google anticompetitively leveraged its dominant market position in wireless handset operating systems by requiring manufacturers to pre-install the Google Search app and browser app (Chrome) as a condition for licensing Google's app store (the Play Store), paying large manufacturers and mobile network operators for exclusive pre-installation of the Google Search app, and preventing manufacturers wishing to pre-install Google apps from selling other mobile devices running on alternative versions of Android not approved by Google. See European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google's Search Engine (July 18, 2018) .
240. See, e.g., Nicas, supra note 99 (reporting that Google, in addition to running millions of automated auctions to rank ads and decide how much advertisers pay, "is one of the largest single buyers of its own search ads, meaning it frequently bids against its [upstream] customers for spots atop its search results").
241. See Katz & Sallet, supra note 124, at 2170-71 (observing that competitive conditions and harms can manifest in different ways on opposite sides of a platform).
242. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 221, at 554 (contending that an analysis that focuses solely on the "free" product often leads to the simplistic conclusion that the transaction creates only positive welfare effects).
243. Frieden, supra note 22, at 320.
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lock-in, and anticompetitive tactics.
244
The goals for recalibration should focus on acquiring a better understanding of platform operator practices and their impacts rather than serve as a justification for more intrusive government oversight. 245 Such a holistic approach can better assess the costs and benefits generated by platform intermediaries. It does not always support an analysis on both market sides, but a thorough assessment provides greater certainty in conclusions to concentrate solely on one side. For example, the Supreme Court undertook an analysis of both market sides of a dominant local newspaper and concluded that only the downstream side mattered in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States. 246 In this case, the Court opted to focus solely on downstream market effects, considering a newspaper platform as one-sided because the impact of an alleged vertical restraint largely affected only one side. 247 The Court determined that requiring advertisers to buy placements in both morning and evening editions of the newspaper primarily benefitted consumers by increasing financial subsidies available to them in the form of subsidized subscriptions and single edition prices with only insignificant direct or indirect effects on the local marketplace for newspaper advertisements. 245. See Frieden, supra note 22, at 314 (arguing that a better-calibrated assessment of multi-sided market impacts "promotes a thorough and fair assessment without favoring [government] intervention or forbearance").
246. 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 247. Id. at 610 (concluding that the case only concerns the newspaper's activity in the advertising market, not in readership).
248. Id. at 621; see also Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018) ("To be sure, it is not always necessary to consider both sides of a two-sided platform . . . . [I]n the newspaper-advertisement market, the indirect networks effects operate in only one direction; newspaper readers are largely indifferent to the amount of advertising that a newspaper contains."). Hence, a preliminary two-sided market analysis can avoid a finding of harm in a single market-side analysis by confirming that pursuing that mode of analysis is appropriate for the specific evidentiary and legal issues in question.
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[Vol. 68:713 scope of their data mining and sales to third parties. The European Union has sought to identify and implement best practices in data protection and transparency through its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 249 While this comprehensive regulation may overreach and impose excessive and costly procedural requirements, 250 it does identify fundamental consumer rights worthy of protection and enforcement. 251 These include easier ways to know what data companies hold about individuals, clear responsibility for organizations to obtain informed consent before collecting information, timely disclosure of data breaches, the right to secure corrections to inaccurate data, opt-out opportunities, and an enforcement mechanism for violations. 252 The GDPR offers additional consumer safeguards that might hamper the business plans of digital intermediaries and advertiser-supported access to content. 253 These include the right to be forgotten-i.e., the mandatory elimination of information about a person deemed nonrepresentative and potentially damaging and private, for example information about prior criminal convictions, and other judicial proceedings, such as a bankruptcy filing and revenge pornography. 254 The GDPR also requires data portability that confers elements of an often-murky place, much mischief and worse behavior can occur that reduces or eliminates the benefits flowing downstream to consumers.
261
The Supreme Court's conservative majority appears to have embraced relatively new economic doctrine supporting a netting of competitive and consumer impacts on both sides of a digital platform with an eye toward bolstering its baseline preference to support corporate flexibility free of government oversight. 262 However, doing so has generated a new precedent that in application may not always favor a libertarian outcome.
To be consistent, courts embracing a two-sided market analysis, should be equally comfortable with two outcomes:
(1) the reversal of a false positive finding of anticompetitive harm by factoring offsetting beneficial effects on consumers and competition occurring on the other side of a platform; but also (2) the reversal of a false negative finding of no anticompetitive harm when factoring countervailing damage occurring on the other side of the platform that a one-sided market analysis would have missed. 263 Validating an examination of platform-generated benefits and harms can help courts update increasingly suspect assumptions about how markets work, particularly via digital broadband networks. Much revered, so-called Chicago School marketplace assumptions and antitrust prescriptions 264 have become suspect, 265 including the view that rational commercial actors (such as Amazon) would never pursue below market pricing in light of the unlikely opportunity of recouping current losses in the future. 266 Likewise, a laser focus on efficiency and consumer welfare, as espoused by Robert Bork, 267 may require a longer timespan that considers whether immediate and easily measured, short-term consumer welfare enhancements are partially or completely offset in the longer-term, particularly in light of what can be discovered with an evidentiary analysis of upstream transactional effects.
268
Consumers and governments often cannot fully assess the consequences of the growing importance of dominant platforms in the global economy. 269 Intentionally limiting the scope of forensic investigation to just one of two market sides risks increasing the likelihood of an incomplete assessment whether consumers and competition benefit or suffer from the "centripetal pull of producers and consumers, and of users and advertisers, toward dominant platforms." 270 Even the most popular and trusted platform operators, such as Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Twitter, have become unintentional and unacceptably passive conduits for a toxic mix of "fake news," identity theft, disinformation, propaganda, defamation, extortion, and character assignation. 271 Reluctance among government agencies and courts to examine upstream transactions and platform subscribers' unwillingness or inability to read and understand their service agreement combine to create opportunities for people and ventures with bad intent to escape detection and sanction. 272 We may soon reach a point where the failure to act may significantly reduce the value position in platform transactions and the level of trust needed to support ever-expanding use.
If stakeholders in the internet ecosystem will not self-regulate and sanction bad actors, government may have to intervene. For already authorized involvement, such as antitrust law enforcement, courts should recalibrate their relevant market definitions to include both
